The Dark Side of Commodification Critiques:
Politics and Elitism in Standardized Testing
Kimberly D. Krawiec
In Testing as Commodification, Katharine Silbaugh argues that
debates within the standardized testing literature represent a split
similar to the one witnessed in traditional debates on the
commodifying effects of market exchange: those who extol the
virtues of a common metric by which to make comparisons and
evaluations, on the one hand, versus those who argue that test scores
have swallowed other notions of the public good in education, on the
other.1 Though the analogy is imperfect, as Silbaugh acknowledges, I
agree that the objections to markets and to standardized testing are
sufficiently similar to render the comparison fruitful.
However, the analogy shows more than Silbaugh acknowledges.
Whereas Silbaugh concludes that her comparison demonstrates the
failure of standardized testing, I contend that it primarily
demonstrates the politically driven and elitist nature of much of the
standardized testing debate.
Politics and elitism in commodification-like protests to
standardized testing should not be terribly surprising. Almost since
their inception, commodification objections have held an elitist flavor
and—because they are more likely to resonate with audiences than
narrower appeals to self-interest—have been invoked for political
gains. If standardized testing debates bear similarities to market
commodification debates, it is only natural that the parallels extend to
these traits as well.
Part I isolates three conceptions of commodification identifiable
in
the
literature
on
markets—cognitive
(or
value)
incommensurability, constitutive incommensurability, and corruption
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—arguing that, although the standardized testing literature bears hints
of the cognitive incommensurability and corruption objections, the
widespread moral outrage typically associated with constitutive
incommensurability is largely absent. As a result, some objections to
standardized testing may be addressable through system
modifications in ways that objections to markets are not.
Part II focuses on the most striking similarities between the
standardized testing debate and more traditional commodification
debates. First, commodification objections in both settings are
political, meaning that they are often invoked by constituencies in
pursuit of a self-interest that is at odds with broader social goals.
Second, they are often elitist, in the sense that the freedom to ponder
the value of social goods other than individual economic betterment
is a luxury not available to all. Finally, they are a catch-all—not all of
the objections to markets (or standardized testing) that are packaged
under the commodification rubric are necessarily about
commodification, nor are they the inevitable result of market
exchange or standardization. Part III concludes that this dark side of
commodification critiques casts doubt on the extent to which
Silbaugh’s commodification analogy undermines the case for
standardized testing.
I. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COMMODIFICATION
It is worth specifying at the outset precisely what it means to
object to markets (or standardized testing) on commodification
grounds. The task is not an easy one, as the term is often loosely
employed to cover a range of objections to particular markets.2
Moreover, as Silbaugh notes, the comparison between the testing
movement and the commodification literature is not perfect,
rendering the definitional question yet more complex.3
In this section, I identify three different, but related,
commodification objections to markets: ―value‖ or cognitive
2. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Note, The Price Of Everything, the Value of Nothing:
Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2003) (noting the imprecision
with which the term commodification is invoked in market debates and proposing a
categorization).
3. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 332, 336.
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incommensurability,
constitutive
incommensurability,
and
corruption.4 Hints of the cognitive incommensurability and
corruption objections to markets can be found in the standardized
testing literature. However, the moral outrage that characterizes
constitutive incommensurability and typically is associated with
taboo markets such as babies, sex, and human organs is largely
absent in the standardized testing debate. As a result, some
standardized testing critiques may be addressable through tweaks to
the system in ways that objections to certain markets are not.
A. Value, or Cognitive, Incommensurability
When values are cognitively incommensurable, people are unable
or unwilling to evaluate certain comparisons because they have no
basis by which to determine how much of X to give up in exchange
for Y; in other words, X and Y are measured on different scales.5 As
Silbaugh notes, ―We might call a person adventurous and another
loyal, recognize that these are different values, struggle to compare
them, but in the end recognize that they will not be pressed into an
agreeable ordering.‖6
This seems a clear point of commonality between objections to
standardized testing and objections to markets, as Silbaugh suggests.
Elizabeth Anderson, for example, argues that ―[b]ecause people value
different goods in different ways,‖ borders must be erected between
the market and ―other domains of self-expression.‖7 Market critics
thus argue against the valuation of many goods, services, or
relationships in monetary terms, contending that the market valuation
of sex, friendship, and reproductive services, among others, is
inappropriate.8
4. Many also raise coercion objections to markets. This objection rests on the purported
need to protect vulnerable populations from financial lures that might encourage unwise risktaking or otherwise induce bargains that the seller would never agree to in the absence of
radically unequal economic conditions. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman’s Worth, 88
N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1742–43 (2010) (distinguishing commodification from coercion).
5. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321–28 (1986) (defining and discussing
incommensurability in great detail).
6. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 333.
7. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 141 (1993).
8. See generally Krawiec, supra note 4 (discussing commodification objections to
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Critics raise similar objections to standardized testing. How do we
compare reading or math ability to team-building skill, leadership, or
ethics, to borrow the examples employed by Silbaugh? We might
recognize that all are valuable, yet irreducible to a common metric.
This is one hurdle (though, as I elaborate below, not an
insurmountable one) to the meaningful use of standardized testing
data—it can be reductionist in precisely this way.9
B. Constitutive Incommensurability
But cognitive, or value, incommensurability is only part of what is
at work in most commodification-based objections to markets. My
offer to Silbaugh of $500 to be my friend is likely to make her angry,
not just confused. Offers of cash for her children or organs are likely
to elicit even stronger emotions, prompting outrage and a desire for
norm enforcement.10 As Joseph Raz observes, ―[F]or almost every
person there are comparisons that he will feel indignant if asked to
make, and which he will, in normal circumstances, emphatically
refuse to make.‖11
In other words, there are comparisons that elicit more than the
mere confusion or inability to compare values associated with value
incommensurability, instead engendering anger, moral outrage, and a
desire for norm enforcement. Such comparisons are constitutively
incommensurable—not just confusing, but so immoral that merely to
consider them compromises the individual’s self-image as a member
of the relevant social community.12
My offer of $500 in exchange for friendship is troubling, not
simply because most people are unable to compare friendship along
prostitution, commercial surrogacy, and compensated oocyte donation); VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005) (demonstrating that the intermingling of economic
transactions with intimate relations causes discomfort both for individuals and for U.S. law,
despite the fact that such intermingling occurs with great frequency).
9. See infra Part II.C (arguing that many objections to standardized testing are really
implementation critiques, rather than critiques of standardized testing itself).
10. Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to Transactions
that Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255, 256 (1997).
11. RAZ, supra note 5, at 346; see also ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 44–64 (discussing
incommensurability of this sort).
12. RAZ, supra note 5, at 345–53 (introducing the concept of constitutive
incommensurables); Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 10, at 256.
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the monetary metric but because we are not supposed to. My failure
to realize this fact immediately confirms that we cannot be true
friends—I have already signaled my failure to understand the
meaning of that relationship.
Many commodification objections to markets are of this
constitutive variety. For example, commercial surrogacy implies to
many market critics a society that fails to understand the unique
importance of motherhood, prostitution a culture that insults the
intimate nature of sexual relations, and cost-benefit analysis a world
that fails to grasp the significance of human life.13 Some reactions to
market pricing mechanisms—for example, organ sales—may reflect
a visceral sense of pure repugnance.14
Do standardized testing objections stem from a similar sense of
constitutive incommensurability? I suspect not. The comparison of
standardized testing to markets seems much more tenuous here.
Though Silbaugh mentions anecdotes that hint at potential
constitutive incommensurability concerns, there is little in the
paper—or elsewhere—to suggest that standardized testing prompts
the widespread sense of moral outrage typically associated with
markets in sex, body parts, children, or other traditionally taboo
exchanges.
This difference carries implications for the viability of
standardized testing. As Al Roth has noted, repugnance can be a
serious constraint to both markets involving money and allocation
procedures that do not involve monetary transactions.15 Constitutive
incommensurability concerns are difficult to overcome because they
are resistant to welfare analysis or arguments regarding means to
contain or minimize any harms or downsides associated with the
activity in question.16 But if commodification objections to
13. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Show Me The Money: Making Markets in
Forbidden Exchange, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at i (discussing a range of
―taboo trades‖).
14. See Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
2007, at 37 (discussing the traditional repugnance toward certain exchanges).
15. Id. at 50–54.
16. Id. This is not to suggest that constitutive incommensurability objections cannot be
overcome. Indeed, resistance to constitutively incommensurable transactions is malleable and
context-dependent, varying across time and cultures. Krawiec, supra note 13, at iv. Individuals
adopt a variety of coping strategies to relieve the cognitive discomfort caused by constitutively
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standardized testing are largely of the cognitive, rather than
constitutive, incommensurability variety, then those objections may
be addressable through tweaks, rather than abandonment, of the
system.
C. Corruption
The third variant on the commodification objection is corruption:
the notion that valuation or exchange metrics from one sphere,
relationship, or setting will necessarily invade or crowd out other
modes of valuation or comparison.17 Silbaugh correctly hones in on
an unresolved tension in the corruption debate, asking (but not
answering) the question of ―why market valuation is particularly
unifying.‖18 Michael Sandel describes the corruption problem as
follows:
[T]he argument from corruption appeals to the character of the
particular good in question. In the cases of surrogacy, babyselling, and sperm-selling, the ideals at stake are bound up with
the meaning of motherhood, fatherhood, and the nurturing of
children. Once we characterize the good at stake, it is always a
further question whether, or in what respect, market valuation
and exchange diminishes or corrupts the character of that
good.19
Silbaugh argues that corruption fears play a large role in
standardized testing debates. She contends, moreover, that such fears
are warranted, stating:
Here the need to make items commensurable . . . actually
transforms the character of the item. The description is selfincommensurable choices and comparisons, including the ready acceptance of smoke screens
and redefining the transaction. Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and
Taboo Cognitions, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 320–21 (2003).
17. Michael J. Sandel, Prof. of Gov’t, Harvard Univ., What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral
Limits of Markets, Lecture at Brasenose College, Oxford (May 11–12, 1998), in THE TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94–95 (1998), available at http://www.tannerlectures.utah.
edu/lectures/documents/sandel00.pdf (discussing corruption).
18. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 315.
19. Sandel, supra note 17, at 104.
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fulfilling: education becomes the thing we have tools to
measure about education.
In the context of education, it is difficult to argue that this
commensurability has not corrupted the character of the item,
because what schools do has changed since we began forcing
schools to measure and compare along a common metric.20
Numerous objections have been raised against the corruption
argument, including its unproven empirical assumptions and potential
essentialism.21 Even advocates of the corruption objection recognize
these difficulties.22 I put that debate to one side, however, for the
purposes of this Article, because it is tangential to the primary lessons
to be drawn from the comparison between standardized testing
disputes and traditional commodification debates. In the following
section, I proceed to the heart of the problem with commodification
objections generally and their specific application to standardized
testing: they are often political, elitist, and a catch-all category for
implementation critiques that are not an inevitable consequence of
standardization or of markets.
II. THE DARK SIDE OF COMMODIFICATION CRITIQUES
Regardless of the above similarities and differences between
commodification objections in the market and standardized testing
contexts, the commodification objection bears three similarities
across the two settings that, understandably, are not explicitly raised
by commodification critics, and are not raised by Silbaugh. These
similarities inspire the reference to ―the dark side of commodification
critiques‖ in this Article’s title and cast doubt on whether Silbaugh’s
commodification analogy demonstrates that standardized testing is
the problem for public education that she contends.
20. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 325.
21. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 290–93 (1999) (challenging
commodification, coercion, and related objections to prostitution specifically, and to the sale of
bodily services more generally); Krawiec, supra note 4 (criticizing commodification objections
to sex work and the sale of reproductive services).
22. See Sandel, supra note 17, at 105–07.
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Specifically, commodification objections to markets are often: (1)
political, in that they are sometimes raised by constituencies in
pursuit of a self-interest that is at odds with broader social goals; (2)
elitist, in that the freedom to ponder the value of social goods other
than individual economic betterment is a luxury not available to all;
and (3) a catch-all, in that not all of the objections to markets (or
standardized testing) that are packaged under the commodification
rubric are necessarily about commodification, nor are they the
inevitable result of market exchange or standardization. As I
demonstrate in this section, the same is true of many of Silbaugh’s
objections to standardized testing.
A. Politics
The first unstated similarity between commodification objections
in the market and standardized testing settings is their political
nature: commodification objections are sometimes raised by
constituencies in pursuit of a self-interest at odds with broader
societal goals. Commodification concerns, by tapping into individual
emotions and social norms, may be employed for strategic purposes
more effectively than narrow appeals to selfish ends, such as rent
seeking.
For example, the insurance industry lobby objects to
commodifying life and gambling on death through various secondary
markets in life insurance, though annuities commodify life and
gamble on death in a similar fashion.23 Coincidentally, secondary life
insurance markets are an economic threat to the insurance industry,
which priced existing premiums on an assumption that many insureds
would allow policies to lapse or trade them in for a fraction of face
value, rather than selling them on the secondary market to investors.24
23. Roth, supra note 14, at 53. For an exhaustive, and fascinating, treatment of available
insurance vehicles, as well as gaps and asymmetries in insurance options, see Lee Fennell,
Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE L.J. (2011).
24. Jenny Anderson, Wall Street Pursues Profit in Bundles of Life Insurance, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 2009, at A1 (noting the insurance industry’s objections to securitized life settlements as
―a gambling product‖ and not ―what life insurance is supposed to be‖ and further noting that the
insurance industry would lose money as a result of the innovation because investors would
continue to pay premiums and collect on the policies, rather than allowing them to lapse as do
many insureds).
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Similarly, the fertility industry defends its price controls on
oocytes—the same type of professional price fixing agreement that
has long been considered per se illegal in less politically charged
industries—on commodification, among other, grounds.25
Given the ease with which narrow self-interest can, in certain
settings, be repackaged as broader commodification concerns, it is
hardly surprising that many of the commodification-like objections to
standardized testing emanate from educators themselves. As Silbaugh
notes, the entire point of the standardized testing program in public
education was to establish a metric by which educators and districts
could be held accountable for performance failures.26 Not
surprisingly, educators as a group prefer self-control to such
accountability to outsiders. Teachers and school districts alike have
less autonomy and flexibility under the current standardized testing
system and are now subject to more outside scrutiny. Educators’
resistance to standardized testing is thus consistent with their own
collective self-interest and with their opposition to merit pay,
vouchers, and a variety of other mechanisms that would subject
educators and school systems to competitive forces or outside
evaluation.27
Silbaugh discusses teacher resistance to merit pay, but as evidence
of ―the cultural differences between schools and policy makers‖ and
as a ―potential insight into the intrinsic motivations of educators and
the alternative (non-market) values in the school’s culture.‖28 While it
is, of course, possible that the divide between the public’s and
educators’ views on the appropriate role of market forces and
competition in education is attributable to cultural differences or
divergent understandings of intrinsic motivations, the more obvious
possibility is that teachers, as a collective body, benefit from an
insulation from competition.
25. See generally Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: PriceFixing in the Gamete Market, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2009, at 59 (discussing price
controls in the oocyte market).
26. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 311.
27. See William Howell, Paul E. Peterson & Martin West, Education Next-PEPG Survey
2010, EDUC. NEXT (Aug. 25, 2010), http://educationnext.org/files/Complete_Survey_Results_
2010.pdf.
28. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 321.
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Research indicates, for example, that pay dispersion is lower
among unionized workers than among the non-unionized for a variety
of reasons, including that unions traditionally have opposed merit pay
schemes.29 Although there are several potential explanations for this
opposition, one is:
[T]he principle that employees can collectively bargain with
their employer over pay . . . . Where pay is determined by a set
of performance indicators, rather than through collective
bargaining, trade unions and the workers they represent lose
vital influence over pay and related matters.30
This is not to suggest that educators have no valid objections to
standardized testing (or to vouchers and merit pay, for that matter).
Teachers are, after all, education experts and are also well positioned
on the front lines of public education to render useful insights. But,
given the interests at stake, it would be naïve to accept their
objections to standardized testing at face value.
B. Elitism
A second similarity between commodification objections to
markets and those to standardized testing is their frequently elitist
nature. Kenneth Arrow raised this point in 1972, when comparing
Richard Titmuss’s views on the impersonal altruism of the small
number of blood donors in the United Kingdom to an ―aristocracy of
saints.‖31 Martha Nussbaum reaffirmed it when she argued that much
commodification-based opposition to sex work fails to appreciate the
―other realities of working life of which it is a part.‖32
29. See generally David Metcalf, Kirstine Hansen & Andy Charlwood, Unions and the
Sword of Justice: Unions and Pay Systems, Pay Inequality, Pay Discrimination and Low Pay,
167 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV. 61 (2001). Other reasons include that unionized jobs are more
homogenized than nonunion jobs and that unions negotiate over the minimum wage, truncating
the lower end of the pay scale. Id.
30. Id. at 63 (quoting Internal Policy Document, Communication Workers Union,
Performance-Related Pay—Panacea or Pain? (1999)). Median voter models also predict that
over half of employees will favor a redistribution of wages towards the lower end of the pay
scale. Id.
31. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 360 (1972).
32. NUSSBAUM, supra note 21, at 297.
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Silbaugh mentions repeatedly that difficult-to-test topics such as
art, music, physical education, critical thinking, and the like are being
dropped from the curriculum in favor of those subjects more
amenable to standardized testing, emphasizing that the burden falls
hardest on poorer school districts because more affluent suburban
districts can afford to retain these subjects, while still attaining
―adequate yearly progress.‖33 Assuming that it is true that art, music,
critical thinking, and similar topics were systematically more likely to
be included in the curricula of poorer school districts prior to the
standardized testing movement, the empirical question of whether
similarly situated students from poorer districts are better off learning
art, music, and physical education than their more testable substitute
topics remains an open empirical question.
The reality of differential educational funding across school
districts in the United States necessarily means that poorer districts
are faced with choices and trade-offs: choices among students,
choices among subjects, and choices among the various means to
deploy scarce resources. Silbaugh’s argument that scarce time and
resources are being spent on Subject A, rather than on Subject B,
proves nothing in the absence of evidence that—given the necessity
of choice—students would be better off learning B instead of A. If
children in poorer school districts are being deprived of valuable
education opportunities, the problem would appear to lie with the
differential funding of public education in the United States and the
consequent consistent poverty of some school districts, rather than
with standardized testing.
Finally, Silbaugh criticizes the flattening effect of standardized
testing, arguing that:
[t]he testing trend takes multiple values that have co-existed
and reduces them to the one value, which even in its best light
can only be expressed as competence in math, reading, and
writing, without reference to other necessary skills for a
fulfilling life or citizenship. Not only is this a flat choice
among the numerous values public education serves, it fails to
33. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 319–20.
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reach the citizenship values that have long helped to justify the
public investment in free education.34
But the freedom to focus on education’s role in citizenship values
and an otherwise fulfilling life—rather than simple workforce
readiness—is a luxury that many communities cannot afford. Indeed,
the ability to view education as anything more than a means of
individual (or familial) economic betterment is an indulgence not
available to all, nor is any real ability to participate in the broader
collective ―community‖ or exercise the rights and obligations of full
citizenship associated with it.
Silbaugh’s argument in this regard brings to mind Arrow’s 1972
critique of Titmuss:
[Titmuss] is especially interested in the expression of
impersonal altruism. It is not the richness of family
relationships or the close ties of a small community that he
wishes to promote. It is rather a diffuse expression of
confidence by individuals in the workings of a society as a
whole. But such an expression of impersonal altruism is as far
removed from the feelings of personal interaction as any
marketplace. Indeed, the small number of blood donors in the
United Kingdom suggests, if I were to generalize as freely as
Titmuss does, the idea of an aristocracy of saints.35
All else being equal, life may be richer, more robust, and betterlived with a knowledge of art, music, and critical thinking. In an ideal
world, these tools would be available to all. But Silbaugh fails to
show that, in our far from ideal public education system, their neglect
in favor of the deployment of scarce resources toward competence in
reading, math, and writing is an unwise decision, much less an
irrational one.
34. Id. at 332.
35. Arrow, supra note 31, at 360.
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C. Commodification as a Catch-All
Finally, not all of the objections to markets typically packaged
under the commodification rubric are necessarily about
commodification, nor are they the inevitable result of market
exchange. Instead, ―commodification‖ often operates as a catch-all
complaint to encompass a variety of concerns, many of which could
be addressed through a better market (or better-regulated market).36
Similarly, many of Silbaugh’s objections to standardized testing
are not necessarily about commodification, nor are they the inevitable
result of standardization. For example, Silbaugh cites to ―government
statistics showing an increase in time spent on language arts and math
and a decrease in time spent on science and social studies,‖ as
evidence of the negative effects of standardized testing.37 She
laments:
[T]he consensus is that schools across the country have
adapted their curricula to focus on subjects that are tested by
reducing the time spent on subjects that are not a part of the
testing program, such as social studies, and ones that are not
susceptible to standardized testing at all, such as music, art,
and physical education.38
As discussed in Part II.B, above, Silbaugh never demonstrates
why an increased focus on language arts and math is necessarily
negative, even if it occurs at the expense of time spent on science and
social studies. But assuming that she is correct, the problem she has
identified is not one of commodification, nor even of standardization,
but of implementation. She suggests no obvious reason why social
studies, science, or even physical education could not successfully be
implemented into the standardized testing program, or why those
36. Peggy Radin argues, for example, that any corrupting effect of market exchange on
sex can be reduced by interventions that fall short of banning the market. See generally
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996) (arguing for incomplete
commodification of certain contested market exchanges). Radin contends that measures such as
licensing, zoning, and advertising restrictions can keep sex markets in their properly cabined
place where they are out of sight and thus potentially out of mind. Id. at 132–36.
37. Silbaugh, supra note 1, at 324.
38. Id.
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school districts with the resources to teach at a level above the floor
required by standardized tests have failed to do so. Thus, if the
system has failed on this front it would appear to be because of faulty
program design, not because of standardized testing itself.
CONCLUSION
In Testing As Commodification, Katharine Silbaugh compares
debates within the standardized testing literature to more traditional
debates on the commodifying effects of markets. Though the analogy
between commodification-like arguments across the two settings is
imperfect, the comparison yields more insights than, I suspect,
Silbaugh realizes. In particular, though Silbaugh concludes that her
analysis demonstrates the failures of standardized testing, her analogy
primarily reveals the politically driven and elitist nature of the
standardized-testing debate.
No doubt there are costs, inefficiencies, and failures associated
with standardized testing, and Silbaugh may well have identified
elements of the program in need of reform. But, far from
demonstrating that today’s educational system is systematically
inferior to the pre-testing status quo, she has primarily shown why the
objections of many standardized-testing critics should be viewed with
skepticism, rather than accepted at face value.

